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RECENT DECISIONS
Mental Health-Constitutional Right of Counsel-Role of
Attorney in Civil Commitment Proceedings-The recent
case of State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy' considered at length
the role of an attorney appointed as "adversary counsel" to
represent persons sought to be committed under the new State
Mental Health Act.2 This decision is more easily understood as
a postscript to the landmark case of Lessard v. Schmidt.'
I. BACKGROUND DEVELOPMENTS IN MENTAL
HEALTH LAW IN WISCONSIN
In 1972 the Federal District Court for the Eastern District
of Wisconsin declared the Wisconsin civil commitment proce-
dure unconstitutional because it lacked many of the procedural
safeguards which have long been mandatory in criminal trials.4
In reaching its decision, the court rejected the twin arguments
which are traditionally put forward to justify the less stringent
procedural safeguards afforded in civil commitment proceed-
ings, i.e., (1) that the proceeding is for the benefit of the defen-
dant under the parens patriae doctrine and (2) that such safe-
guards do not apply to civil proceedings.5
1. 75 Wis. 2d 276, 249 N.W.2d 573 (1977).
2. Wis. STAT. § 51.20(4) (1975).
3. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). Lessard was vacated by the Supreme Court,
414 U.S. 473 (1974), and remanded for clarification, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis.
1974). It was again vacated, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), to be considered in light of a subse-
quent Supreme Court decision which was found to be inapplicable, 413 F. Supp. 1318
(E.D. Wis. 1976).
4. The court found the Act to be procedurally inadequate in the following respects:
[I]t fails to require effective and timely notice of the "charges" under which a
person is sought to be detained; fails to require adequate notice of all rights,
including the right to jury trial; permits detention longer than 48 hours without
a hearing on probable cause; permits detention longer than two weeks without
a full hearing on the necessity for commitment; permits commitment based
upon a hearing in which the person charged with mental illness is not repre-
sented by adversary counsel, at which hearsay evidence is admitted, and in
which psychiatric evidence is presented without the patient having been given
the benefit of the privilege against self-incrimination; permits commitment
without proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the patient is both "mentally ill"
and dangerous; and fails to require those seeking commitment to consider less
restrictive alternatives to commitment.
349 F. Supp. at 1103.
5. By its terms, the fifth amendment, guaranteeing the rights against self-
incrimination and of due process of law, appears to apply only in criminal cases: "nor
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The Lessard decision adopted a rationale similar to that
used by the United States Supreme Court in extending similar
due process protection to participants in juvenile court pro-
ceedings. Several courts in other states have reached similar
conclusions7 and the Supreme Court of the United States has
recently ruled that "a State cannot confine without more a
nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in
freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible
family members or friends."8
With respect to the right of counsel, Lessard held that the
prior Wisconsin law, providing that the court in a commitment
proceeding "may . . . appoint a guardian ad litem for [the
patient,]"' was "defective" for two reasons: (1) it did not pro-
vide for automatic appointment of counsel, at least for indi-
gents and (2) the guardians ad litem appointed under the law
were not sufficiently "adversary"'" to satisfy the constitutional
shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. Similarly, the rights to a speedy trial, to confrontation with adverse wit-
nesses and to counsel are not specifically guaranteed in civil trials by the sixth amend-
ment: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, . . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
6. "[S]tudies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to whether
actual performance measures well enough against theoretical purpose to make tolera-
ble the immunity of the process from the reach of constitutional guaranties applicable
to adults." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 552 (1966). "To hold otherwise [than
that the fifth amendment applies to juvenile proceedings] would be to disregard
substance because of the feeble enticement of the 'civil' label-of-convenience. . .
For this purpose, at least, commitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration
against one's will, whether it is called 'criminal' or 'civil'." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49-
50 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966). However, it should be noted
that, in holding as it did, the Lessard court did have to limit dicta in Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) to the effect that compulsory treatment of a person with
a disease is constitutionally acceptable.
7. See, e.g., Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); Lynch v. Baxley,
386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Quesnell v. State, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 517 P.2d 568
(1974); State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1974).
8. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). The Court specifically dec-
lined to deal with procedures required for involuntary commitments.
9. Wis. STAT. § 51.02(4) (1973) (repealed effective September 4, 1976).
10. As a matter of fact, the attorney appointed in Lessard perceived his role as
nonadversarial and nonrepresentative enough so that, in response to a question relat-
ing to adjournment, he stated: "[M]y independent decision . . . is that . . . she
should be represented by an attorney." 349 F. Supp. at 1098.
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mandate for effective legal representation."
In response to the Lessard decision, Wisconsin enacted a
new Mental Health Act 12 which incorporates most of the proce-
dural safeguards required by that decision. In particular, the
Wisconsin statute provides for automatic appointment of
"adversary counsel" immediately upon the filing of the peti-
tion to commit. Indigents are to be provided counsel at county
expense. 3 Although the statute requires that counsel be
"adversary," it does not define the role or responsibilities of
those appointed under the Act."
II. THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE ATrORNEY'S RoLE
All of the constitutionally mandated procedural safeguards
are meaningless to a person who is subjected to commitment
proceedings unless coupled with effective representation by
counsel. 5 Indeed, the adversary lawyer serves as the linchpin
upon which the vitality of the factfinding process of the hearing
depends. Yet in many places the lawyer's role has been limited
to seeing that the proper papers were filed 6 or that the statu-
tory notice requirements were met.17 This ineffective represen-
tation can be attributed to many factors, not the least of which
is the confusion over the appointed attorney's role in the pro-
ceedings.
Several causes are responsible for this "rolelessness." Often
great deference is accorded the testimony of medical and psy-
chological experts regarding the patient's best interests.'8 Un-
11. Id. at 1097, 1099.
12. 1975 Wis. Laws, ch. 430.
13. "Legal Counsel. At the time of filing of the petition the court shall appoint
adversary counsel unless the subject individual chooses to retain his or her own attor-
ney. If the individual is indigent, the court shall provide counsel at county expense."
Wis. STAT. § 51.20(4) (1975).
14. By implication, however, that role is to be more than perfunctory. Counsel is
given the power to request postponement of the hearing, to request an additional
medical or psychological examination, of access to psychiatric and other reports (not
enjoyed by his client), to demand a jury trial, and to move for a closed hearing. Wis.
STAT. § 51.20(8)(a), (10)(a), (11)(b), (12), (13) (1975).
15. "[The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel." Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31
(1972), quoting from Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
16. See Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally
11, 44 TAx. L. REv. 424 (1966) [hereinafter Cohen].
17. Id. at 440.
18. See Zander, Civil Commitment in Wisconsin: The Impact of Lessard v.
Schmidt, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 503 [hereinafter Zander], where the author quotes the
1977]
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fortunately, greater weight than is justified is often given to
such evidence. The testimony of these experts is not restricted
to scientific facts and empirical data. Rather, it is often laden
with speculation and conjecture.'9 Few persons subjected to
commitment proceedings have sufficient financial resources to
retain their own expert witnesses. Thus, appointed counsel is
often forced to listen to the opinion evidence presented against
the client, knowing that he is unable to present any competent
evidence in rebuttal.
Another cause of this "rolelessness" is that the appointed
commitment attorney is often uncertain as to who the client is,
and what goals he is to seek for that client. The dangers inher-
ent in any patronage system are present in this situation.
Whether the motivation is conscious or subconscious, there is
a danger that the judge will tend to appoint attorneys who take
a passive role and do not complicate the proceedings. Concomi-
tantly, there is a risk that the appointee will not take an agres-
sive approach, hoping to satisfy the judge and enhance the
prospects for future appointments."
Even if the attorney correctly concludes that the ends of the
defendant are of foremost importance, a problem exists in de-
termining precisely what those ends are. Unlike the criminal
lawyer who knows that it is in the client's best interest to "get
off," the civil commitment advocate has no clear criterion of
success. 2' A decision must first be made as to what is in the
client's best interest. That is, whether the client will best be
following portion of the record from an involuntary commitment hearing held in Mil-
waukee County in August, 1974:
Defense attorney: . . . [flt's a little difficult for me to understand how full-
time inpatient hospitalization at this time would be the cure ....
Court: I have the same feeling. However, I'm not expert in psychiatric mat-
ters. The experts have testified. My feelings are the same as yours, but I can't
disregard the expert testimony.
See also Cohen, supra note 16, at 450.
19. See, e.g., Ennis & Litwach, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise:
Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REv. 693 (1974); Leifer, The Competence
of the Psychiatrist to Assist in the Determination of Incompetency: A Skeptical Inquiry
Into the Courtroom Functions of Psychiatrists, 14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 564 (1963).
20. Andalman & Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commit-
ment: A Survey, a Polemic and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43, 83 (1974) [hereinafter
Andalman & Chambers]. Indeed, in one Arizona county, the advocate actually as-
sisted the court in presenting the case against his client. Wexler and Scoville, The
Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 ARiz. L. REv.
1, 53 (1971) [hereinafter Wexler and Scoville].
21. Cohen, supra note 16, at 447.
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served by commitment or freedom or some other intermediate
alternative, such as outpatient treatment.22
A more fundamental dilemma arises when the lawyer and
client disagree as to what are in the client's best interests. This
most often occurs when the attorney believes that the client
should be committed, and the patient, quite expectedly, op-
poses confinement. To advocate the client's position in such a
case would violate what many lawyers believe is their duty to
the client and the public. To fail to do so is to deny the client
"adversary counsel" in the commitment proceeding. Whether
the attorney in this situation should implement his own notions
of what is in the client's "best interests" or assume the
"adversary" position of his client is presently an unresolved
question in American law.2s
To compound the problem, the civil commitment process in
most areas implicitly rejects the possibility of any meaningful
advocacy by failing to provide the defending attorney with any
of the normal opportunities and incentives to perform well.
Often the attorney is paid a flat rate, and more often than not,
that rate is far lower than that received for defending an indi-
gent in a criminal case.24 In many places, the attorney is sad-
dled with a workload which makes it impossible to adequately
prepare each case. 5
As a consequence of this "rolelessness," many writers have
called for the enactment of a statutory role for the commitment
attorney.26 The Memmel decision attempts to deal with this
problem by judicial action.
22. Id. at 451-52.
23. See, e.g., Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process: A
Theoretical Framework, 84 YALE L.J. 1540, 1541 (1975) [hereinafter The Role of
Counsel].
24. A few examples are illustrative. A flat rate of $10 was paid in Texas in 1966.
Cohen, supra note 16, at 445. Similarly, Maricopa County in Arizona allowed $10 per
case in 1971. Wexler and Scoville, supra note 20, at 55. However, this is by no means
universal. Dane County in Wisconsin pays its court appointed attorneys $35 per hour.
Zander, supra note 18, at 514.
25. In one afternoon session in Texas in 1966, 40 patients were committed in ap-
proximately 75 minutes. Cohen, supra note 16, at 430.
26. See Andalman & Chambers, supra note 20, at 78-79; Cohen, supra note 16, at
436 n.58; Brunett, The Right to Counsel, Waiver Thereof, and Effective Assistance of
Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings, 29 Sw. L.J. 684, 712 (1975).
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Im. EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT'S
DECISION IN State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy
Despite the Lessard court's ruling that a guardian ad litem
does not provide sufficient representation to satisfy the consti-
tutional right of counsel, 27 and despite the incorporation of the
phrase "adversary counsel" into Wisconsin's Mental Health
Act,2 the Wisconsin bar was still uncertain in 1976 whether to
adopt the "best interests" role or the "adversary" role as a
prototype in civil commitment proceedings. According to one
study, eighty percent of the surveyed Wisconsin judges still
endorsed the "best interests" role, whereas only twelve percent
adopted the "adversary" position .2 However, a clear majority
of the responding practitioners viewed their role as that of an
adversary.30
Even after the Lessard decision, most of Milwaukee
County's commitment hearings were hardly more than per-
functory. The average probable cause hearing31 lasted nine
minutes, and the average involuntary commitment trial took
only thirteen minutes.32
27. 349 F. Supp. at 1099. See also Gupta, New York's Mental Health Information
Service: An Experience in Due Process, 25 RUTGEaS L. Rxv. 405, 438 (1974) [here-
inafter Gupta].
28. Wis. STAT. § 51.20(4) (1975).
29. The survey asked participants to choose between two role descriptions, either:
(a) The attorney representing a defendant in a commitment proceeding
should do everything in his power as an attorney to see that his client is not
committed, if his client resists hospitalization, or if his client articulates no
opinion ....
(b) [I]f the defendant articulates no opinion or if the attorney feels that his
client is incompetent to make the decision concerning the need for hospitaliza-
tion, then the attorney should do what he feels is in his client's best interest even
if it means involuntary hospitalization.
Zander, supra note 18, at 516.
30. Only one of the two Milwaukee County judges who hear commitment proceed-
ings responded to the survey and he endorsed the "best interests" position. Two of the
three responding Milwaukee attorneys who regularly handled commitment proceed-
ings favored the "best interests" position and the other chose the "adversary" role.
The responding Dane County commitment judge endorsed the "best interests"
position, as did one of the ten Dane County practitioners who replied. The other nine
Dane County attorneys favored the "adversary" role. Id.
31. A probable cause hearing is required to continue involuntary detention longer
than 48 hours. Wis. STAT. § 51.15(4) (1975).
32. Zander, supra note 18, at 520, 526. These statistics were stipulated to in the
appeal from the habeas corpus proceeding in State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, 75 Wis.
2d 276, 249 N.W.2d 573 (1976). The comparable figures for Dane County (also stipu-




The attorneys-automatically appointed for each Milwau-
kee County commitment proceeding after the Lessard deci-
sion-were chosen in ninty-nine percent of the cases from a
closed panel of six attorneys and their average rate of compen-
sation was $25.45 per case.13 The vast majority of the proce-
dural rights guaranteed in Lessard were waived in both the
probable cause and commitment hearings. 4 Furthermore, the
attorneys asked an average of less than two questions on cross
examination at each type of proceeding. 5
As might be expected, a number of habeas corpus proceed-
ings were instituted by persons involuntarily committed under
this procedure.36 One of these was a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus brought by David Memmel on March 31, 1976, which
alleged that he was being illegally restrained by Edwin A.
Mundy, director of the Milwaukee County institutions. On
April 28, Judith Pagels moved to intervene on behalf of a class
of persons involuntarily committted to the Milwaukee County
Mental Health Center. The circuit court granted the motion,
but the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued temporary writs of
prohibition to restrain further proceedings. However, on May
14, these writs were dissolved. On July 12, prior to the final
circuit court judgment, the Milwaukee County Board of Judges
adopted a new rule for the appointment of "adversary coun-
sel. ' ' 3 Rule 640, as it was called, abolished the closed panel
system and provided that appointments were to be made from
a panel of attorneys presented by the Milwaukee Bar Associa-
tion and supplemented by the court.3
33. The comparable Dane County figure was $390 per case. Brief for Appellant at
107, State ex ret. Memmel v. Mundy, 75 Wis. 2d 276, 249 N.W.2d 573 (1976).
34. The right to request a transcript of the probable cause hearing and to issue
subpoenas were waived in 99% of the cases; the right to file written motions in 100%
of the cases; and the rights to a jury trial, to appeal and to petition for a reexamination
in all but one case between January 1, -1975 and April 1, 1976. Id. at 109-13.
35. Id. at 109-11.
36. At the time of the appeal, 15 commitments had been invalidated on the
grounds that the defendants had been denied due process of law. Id. at 111.
37. This rule was adopted pursuant to statute which empowers the Board of
Judges, in counties with a population greater than 200,000, to establish rules of proce-
dure. Wis. STAT. § 257.37 (1975). The effect of the adoption of this rule is dealt with
in the text accompanying footnotes 67-72, infra.
38. Involuntary Commitment Proceedings. A panel of attorneys will be presented
by the Milwaukee Bar Association and supplemented by the court. The court will
select attorneys from the panel serially to represent defendants. The list shall be
updated periodically by the court and Association, but not less than once a year.
75 Wis. 2d at 280, 249 N.W.2d at 575.
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On August 3, the parties filed findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law with the trial court, wherein they stipulated that
the petitioners had been denied "the effective assistance of
counsel" and "due process of law. '3 9 The trial court issued an
order on August 18, directing the release of all petitioners or a
rehearing within sixty days of September 1. The defendant was
directed to provide immediate office space for the Milwaukee
County Legal Aid staff and was required to confer with the
county executive, the county board of supervisors and petition-
ers' attorneys and to formulate and present to the court a per-
manent plan for representing indigent patients at commitment
hearings." On September 7, the trial court amended the Au-
gust 18 order and appointed the Legal Aid Society of Milwau-
kee to represent indigents at commitment proceedings until a
permanent plan could be presented to the trial court. The court
also directed the Legal Aid Society to hire additional staff, and
retained continuing jurisdiction over the case to oversee the
implementation of the orders.4 This order (and not the August
18 order) was appealed by the defendant.
On September 4, prior to the subsequently appealed order
of September 7,42 the parties to the action, as well as the Chief
Judge of Milwaukee County (representing the Milwaukee
County Board of Judges) entered a stipulation stating that the
Legal Aid Society would be appointed to represent defendants
in civil commitment proceedings pursuant to the rule making
authority of the Milwaukee County Board of Judges. The stip-
ulation was to remain in effect until the trial court's order was
stayed or amended by that court or the Wisconsin Supreme
Court.
39. "[The Court concludes and determines beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. That
petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights to trial by jury and the effective assistance of
counsel and petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law have been
unlawfully restricted thereby." Brief for Appellant at 114, supra note 34.
40. 75 Wis. 2d at 277-78, 249 N.W.2d at 574.
41. a. The Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee shall represent indigent patients
at involuntary mental commitment proceedings until a permanent plan to pro-
vide such representation can be presented to the trial court.
b. The Legal Aid Society shall hire additional staff to implement the trial
court's order.
c. The trial court will retain continuing jurisdiction over the case to oversee
the implementation of its orders.
d. [Defendant's] motion to review and/or stay the above order is denied.
Id. at 278-79, 249 N.W.2d at 575.
42. September 4 was also the date the new mental health act became effective.
[Vol. 61:187
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Thereafter, the defendant successfully moved the supreme
court to stay enforcement of the September 7 order. One month
later, after receiving a report from the Milwaukee County pro-
bate judges that rule 640 was being implemented, the supreme
court ordered that pending hearing on the merits of the case,
the Milwaukee County courts holding commitment proceed-
ings were to make attorney appointments "seriatim on a case
by case basis from the list of attorneys as approved by the
Milwaukee County Board of Judges subject to the approval of
the appointing judge as to any particular attorney. '43
In an attempt to finally resolve the representation question,
the supreme court decided to hear a declaratory judgment peti-
tion filed by respondents Memmel and Pagels," who sought a
delineation of the role and responsibility of appointed counsel
in commitment proceedings."5
IV. THE WIscONsIN SUPREME COURT's DECISION
A. The Reaffirmation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility6
In delineating the role and responsibility of adversary coun-
sel, the court made clear "that such appointed counsel has the
same function, duties and responsibilities as he would have if
he were retained by the person involved as his or her own attor-
ney."'" Consequently, the Code of Professional Responsibility
applies48 and the commitment attorney's responsibilities in-
clude preserving the confidences and secrets of the client,"
exercising independent professional judgment on behalf of the
client,10 and representing a client competently,"1 and zealously
within the bounds of the law. 2 The court saw no reason why
the duty of a lawyer should vary with the type of legal proceed-
ing involved.
43. 75 Wis. 2d at 279, 249 N.W.2d at 575.
44. This petition was considered by the court as an exercise of its superintending
control over inferior courts. Wis. CoNsT. art. VII, § 3.
45. 75 Wis. 2d at 280, 249 N.W.2d at 573.
46. 43 Wis. 2d ix to lxxvi-b.
47. 75 Wis. 2d at 283, 249 N.W.2d at 577.
48. Id. at 284, 249 N.W.2d at 577.
49. 43 Wis. 2d at xxxvi.
50. Id. at xxxix to x/viii (Canon 5).
51. Id. at x/ix to 1 (Canon 6).
52. Id. at 1i to Ixvii (Canon 7).
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One effect of this decision is to make it clear that the com-
mitment attorney's client is the person sought to be protected,
not the interests of the judge in streamlining the proceedings
and not the interests of the public in confining potentially dan-
gerous individuals. -The decision certainly contemplates more
of an "adversary" posture in contested commitment proceed-
ings and this necessarily involves more work for the appointed
attorney. Rather than merely acquiescing in the petitioning
doctor's recommendation, 3 the commitment attorney should
make any necessary independent investigation of facts in order
to challenge the expert testimony. 4 Where feasible, the attor-
ney should consult with the client to ascertain the client's de-
sires and to advise the client of the available alternatives and
their ramifications ." The performance of these duties provides
the minimum duties necessary for adequate representation re-
gardless of whether the attorney is privately retained or ap-
pointed by the court.56
That an adversarial system is essential to preserve the
rights guaranteed in Lessard cannot be doubted. 7 A system of
involuntary confinement should be skewed toward undercom-
mitment, if at all, in a society which prizes its liberty. 8 Yet,
the Memmel decision does not guarantee that such a procedure
will be followed. By failing to promulgate any more specific
53. Several writers have noted the tendency of doctors to overpredict, rather than
allow a potential murderer or suicide victim to go free. See The Role of Counsel, supra
note 23, at 1553-54. Golten, Role of Defense Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process,
10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 385, 414-17 (1972).
54. It is difficult to imagine a competent attorney representing a client in a
personal injury action or in any other case involving medical or technical ques-
tions without at least consulting his own professional experts and cross-
examining the adverse experts. Indeed, it is disheartening to realize that when
we deal not with the liberty-threatening situation of commitment, but deal
instead with lucrative cases such as will contests and traumatic neurosis per-
sonal injury matters, lawyers hardly seem unduly deferential to-or bewildered
by-the damning pronouncements of adverse psychiatrists.
Wexler and Scoville, supra note 20, at 52.
55. To do this a lawyer must be familiar with the law in this field. However, one
writer has described the commitment lawyer as "a stranger in a strange land without
benefit of guidebook, map, or dictionary." Cohen, supra note 16, at 424.
56. Precisely what the appointed commitment attorney should do has been the
subject of numerous articles. See, e.g., Andalman, supra note 20, at 50-54; Cohen,
supra note 16, at 450-57.
57. See Gupta, supra note 27, at 438.
58. Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Commitment,
117 PA. L. Rv. 75-76 (1968); Andalman & Chambers, supra note 20, at 49.
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guidelines for the "adversary counsel" the court left each indi-
vidual attorney with the responsibility to interpret the Code as
it applies to a particular commitment case. Indeed, the argu-
ment could be made that the Milwaukee County practice be-
fore this decision was constitutionally adequate. The Code was
in effect throughout its duration, but the court declined to deal
with its constitutionality since the original August 18 order,
which declared the prior representation practice inadequate,
had not been appealed. 9
Furthermore, the Memmel decision did not resolve the con-
troversy over the "adversary" or "best interest" roles. Both the
Lessard decision"0 and the new state Mental Health Act"' re-
quire an "adversary" role for commitment counsel. Addition-
ally, the Memmel court, in citing the Code's duty of zealous
representation"2 seems to imply that the client's desires are to
control the ends the lawyer seeks. However, the Code itself is
unclear on this point. In the ethical considerations for Canon
VII, it is noted that "the authority to make decisions is exclu-
sively that of the client."' 3 However, at another point the same
Code states that when "the disability of a client and the lack
of a legal representative compel the lawyer to make decisions
for his client, the lawyer should. . . act with care to safeguard
and advance the interests of his client."' 4 Even though the
Code advises that in such circumstances the lawyer should
"obtain all possible aid" 5 from his client, is it ever appropriate
for a lawyer to decide that his client is incapable of determining
his own "best interests" during the course of a proceeding
brought to determine precisely that capability?"
B. The Court's Sanction of the Milwaukee
County Appointment System
As an exercise of its power of "superintending control over
inferior courts,"' 7 the court approved Rule 640: "We now ex-
59. 75 Wis. 2d at 287, 249 N.W.2d at 579.
60. 349 F. Supp. at 1103.
61. Wis. STAT. § 51.20(4) (1975).
62. 75 Wis. 2d at 284, 249 N.W.2d at 577.
63. 43 Wis. 2d lii (EC 7-7).
64. Id. at liv (EC 7-12).
65. Id.
66. At least one writer has been prompted to say that the Code "offers little guid-
ance" on this question. The Role of Counsel, supra note 23, at 1544.
67. WIs. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
1977]
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pressly hold such rule to be proper under the statute involved,
and to establish the procedure to be followed . . . in Milwau-
kee County." 8 The court decided the case as a matter of statu-
tory interpretation and chose not to deal with the broader ques-
tion of public policy.69 It was noted, however, that the proce-
dure had "no constitutional infirmity."70 Furthermore, any
holding with respect to .the prior Milwaukee County procedure
was avoided, since the failure to appeal the August 18 order
rendered that issue moot.'
Such a holding appears appropriate for a newly adopted
procedure. However, it gives no indication of the minimum
acceptable standards for implementing the adversary counsel
system in commitment proceedings. For example, left unan-
swered is the question of whether the former average fee for
Milwaukee County commitment attorneys, $25.00,72 is suffi-
cient incentive for lawyers to provide their clients with
"effective assistance of counsel" mandated by the Constitution
in civil commitment hearings. Presumably, the county's former
closed panel selection process would be suspect, but not neces-
sarily invalid under the court's holding.
V. CONCLUSION
Rather than setting forth specific standards to govern the
role and selection of commitment attorneys, the Memmel court
chose to rely on the vague guidelines of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Wisconsin Mental Health Act.73 How-
ever, both the Code and the Mental Health Act were in effect
prior to the Memmel decision and each lacks the requisite spe-
cificity to ensure that those subjected to commitment proceed-
ings will be provided with effective assistance of counsel. By
failing to articulate meaningful due process requirements, the
court has placed the burden of complying with the Lessard
decision on the shoulders of the participating judges and attor-
neys, and has therefore left the door open for a recurrence of
the conditions which gave rise to the current controversy. The
68. 75 Wis. 2d at 287, 249 N.W.2d at 579 (footnote omitted).
69. Id. at 286-87, 249 N.W.2d at 579.
70. Id. at 286, 249 N.W.2d at 578.
71. Id. at 287, 249 N.W.2d at 579.
72. See text accompanying note 34, supra.
73. Wis. STAT. § 51.20(4) (1975).
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mere statement that commitment counsel must assume a more
active, adversary role does not guarantee that future proceed-
ings will be free of constitutional infirmities. Whether those
committed in the future are afforded due process of law re-
mains a question which will have to be determined on a case
by case basis.
THOMAs J. NICHOLS
Constitutional Law-Eighth Amendment-Physical Pun-
ishment In Public Schools-In Ingraham v. Wright,1 the
United States Supreme Court refused to extend the eighth
amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment 2
to Dade County, Florida school children who were severely
beaten by their principal and other school officials. Addition-
ally, while finding that the pupils had a liberty interest in
personal security worthy of protection under the fourteenth
amendment,3 the Court ruled that the Dade County system of
corporal punishment was not itself violative of due process, in
view of the common law safeguards and state tort remedies
available in cases of abuse.
Ingraham was a class action brought for injunctive and dec-
laratory relief and damages by students in Drew Junior High
School on behalf of all students similarly situated in the Dade
County, Florida school system. The plaintiffs alleged that res-
pondent school officials inflicted severe and continuing corpo-
ral punishment upon students in Drew Junior High in violation
of the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual
punishment and deprivation of liberty without due process.
The trial court dismissed the action without the presenta-
1. 97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977).
2. The eight amendment states, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VII.
3. In part, the fourteenth amendment states,
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
19771
